Investor driven forestry businesses--operating under the pressure of financial return --do a poor job of growing high-quality wood, and sacrifice much productive capacity. We believe that strict financial return forestry poorly serves the interests of timber workers and rural communities for three reasons:
(a) Trees are cut too early, thereby losing up to 50% of the land's productive capacity for saw timber. This loss of productive capacity has barely been mentioned in the press and is never advertised by timberland owners. This loss of production is the simple result of cutting before what foresters call the Cumulation of Mean Annual Increment, or CMI.
(b) Logging costs increase per thousand board foot (mbf) with smaller tree harvest, while revenue declines due to the historically lower sale price of small logs. Add in the lost productivity of early cutting and it is understandable why timber companies seek to reduce costs. For example, when adjusted for inflation, the wages of timber worker fell by 38% between 1978 and 1994.
(c) Coast Range industrial forests have been simplified in structure and composition compared to the historic range of variability of the historic coast range forest.
The exhibit's 140-year rotation model is based on aggressive commercial thinning coupled with a final clear-cut harvest. In fact, the fully working 140-year model treats more acres per year than does a forestland owner practicing a no-thin 38-year rotation. Community forestry is more than a long-rotation harvest schedule; it will require new forms of non-governmental forest ownership and public investment in forest capital. Some examples of this kind of ownership are telephone cooperatives and the public utility districts that deliver electric power. It is important that the reader appreciate that we are not advocating government ownership.
The exhibit's arguments and analysis apply to those industrial owners who practice short-rotation forestry. These are generally the corporate owners of most private Coast Range forestland. Some industrial owners who aren't driven by investors manage successfully to practice forestry that is more beneficial to forests and communities.
Investor-driven forest owners use a rotation time based on maximizing their short-term return on investment. This results in a great loss of log product quality and quantity in order for outside investors to get the quickest return on their money. Corporate cut-at-the-earliest-rotation forestry is not in anyone's interest except the investors behind big industrial timber companies.
The analysis compares two forest models for forest size and annual cut volume, and describes the income and expenses associated with each model's operations. The difference between each model is the length of cutting rotation. One model uses a 45-year rotation and the other uses a 140-year rotation.
The 45-year rotation model represents the typical management practiced by today's large corporate forestland owners. We call this model Corporate Forestry. Corporate Forestry is controlled by investor economics, does a poor job of growing high-quality wood, and appears to sacrifice much productive capacity. We call the 140-year rotation model Community Forestry. We show that a longer-rotation forestry is more productive, grows more valuable products, and sustains a forest for multiple values. Thus Community Forestry is a better deal for timber workers and rural communities and has the potential to be a sound business proposition. Our purpose in presenting this analysis is the following:
| 1. | To show that longer-rotation forestry is better for both quantity and quality of logs produced. |
| 2. | To show that longer-rotation forestry is potentially a sound business proposition. |
| 3. | To identify the "problem" that prevents a timber and community-friendly forestry. |
(a) The figures shown below in Forest Income, Expenses and Profit are not a statement of what actual landowners experience. For example, mid-coast and North Coast industrial timberland owners are experiencing a major Swiss Needle Cast outbreak and may see harvest volumes reduced greatly from previous expectations. Our model applies only to healthy industrial forests. While a 140-year rotation forestry is somewhat experimental in the Coast Range region, we believe that the practice of corporate short-rotation forestry is equally untested and experimental.
(b) We developed both forest models for comparison purposes. The income and expense statements are not technically profit statements, as they do not capture all business costs. For example, while road maintenance costs are included in our analysis, the original road-building costs and their depreciation are not. Although we have assumed equal road costs for both forests, we believe that the 140-year rotation forest may have lower costs. Thus, in the case of road cost, any bias favors the Corporate Forest. Additionally, we have removed the land and timber (capital) costs. Because of this, the income and expense statements are more statements of cash flow off the timber land rather than profit or loss for the full business. We will explain below why removing capital costs was desirable, but for now let us state that our selection of certain costs and expenses corrects for the fact that landowners collect no revenue for many forest values like fish habitat or clean water.
When we remove capital from the analysis, the comparison reveals that long-rotation forestry is a potentially lucrative business proposition. Some may criticize us for removing capital costs from our analysis. However, we acknowledge that large-scale sustainable forestry appears noncompetitive in today's financial business world given current government policy. Responsibility to correct for the failings of the market falls on the shoulders of government policy-makers.
The decline of private forests and the good things they provide reflects a market failure to sustain productive forest capital and the rural communities that depend on the forest. Like factory jobs shipped overseas forest liquidation and the reinvestment of the cash in other regions, ships our natural wealth outside the community and region. Forest investors think they have the right to liquidate Coast Range forests and export the cash. We disagree. Our analysis explains the "problem" that prevents a timber and community-friendly forestry. That problem is a financial and political system that discourages forest owners from growing trees much past fifty years of age.
A false battle is raging. Current Corporate Forestry is under fire for harming fish, wildlife and water quality through excessive clearcutting. City folks, often led by well-meaning environmentalists, have been aligned against timber workers and rural communities. This distorts the true situation. Good forestry is compatible with public values. The real conflict is not between environmentalists and the communities that depend on forests. The real problem, as our comparison shows, is investor-controlled ownership driven by accountants, Wall Street investors, and the rules that dictate to stockholder-owned corporations.
What we need is forests that work for Coast Range communities--not for the absentee investors who control the giant timber companies. We believe that "forestry is more than a way to get rich; it is a way of life worthy to be preserved" (Ray Raphael, More Tree Talk). By practicing good forestry--and working together--we can do this.
In our analysis we show that if a company owned two 100,000-acre tracts of Coast Range forest--one managed for a 45-year rotation and the other for a 140-year rotation--based on January 1999 log prices, the positive cash flow from the 140-year rotation forest would be almost 100% greater than from the 45 year rotation forest. Although recent changes in log prices weaken this number slightly, log prices reflect supply and demand and the long-term trend will favor large saw timber regardless of technological advances that expand small saw log demand.
Let's take a closer look at the real problem with private industrial forests. Investor-driven companies--corporations--own the overwhelming share of Northwest private industrial timberland. These corporations are guided by a set of management goals that shape their land management strategy. Investor-owned timberland companies have to compete on the open market for investors. If they fail to perform financially, the price of their stock will fall. This short term financial pressure appears to cause corporate forest owners to liquidate highly productive older (but not old growth) forest capital. Many folks don't understand the mind-set of top corporate management. At the highest level, landowning corporate managers have little commitment to any forest, town, or workforce. They don't place forests, people, and local communities above the financial needs of the company's stockholders. In fact, the key officers of the corporation have a legal obligation to consider first and foremost the hard numbers that represent shareholder interest, and thus they make decisions accordingly.
To understand the behavior of investor-driven companies we need to understand the management goal of achieving a high rate of profit. Another way to say this is return on equity (net profit). These are technical ways of (1) stating how much money (capital) is tied up in a business (a company's book value), (2)reporting the yearly after-tax net profit, and then (3) comparing the ratio of net profit to the money tied up in the business. A big working forest makes more profit than a small working forest, but a big forest's book value will cause the profit ratio to be less than a small forest's (see figures below). Because corporate managers see a forest as an asset, they will go to great lengths to protect it from fire or disease. Yet, if Wall Street analysts see the company's ratios becoming less competitive, management may liquidate perfectly good forest capital and move the cash elsewhere (Chile, Brazil, etc.). Locally, the system of forest finance and investment is failing rural communities and watersheds.
Because trees do not grow faster than compound interest, no investor-controlled business will spend money today for a payoff fifty or more years away. Some family and community forest owners do grow their forests longer than interest rates suggest. They do this because forestry is more than a way to get rich; it is a way of life worthy to be preserved.
Many watershed and fisheries scientists would like to see rotation times of over 200 years (1/2 of 1% of the land area cut every year) to protect fish habitat. From our perspective, managing private forests on rotation times of 200 to 300 years appears to be too restrictive for a viable timber industry. At the other end of the rotation spectrum, managing forests on ultra-short rotations for financial markets and investors is a bad deal for everyone else.
In starting this project, we wanted to know what rotation length is best for rural communities, timber workers, and the wood products industry's long-term health. We chose the 140-year rotation model because it blends high quality, high volume timber output with a much lower impact on water quality and streams.
In a community-based forestry a new perspective on forest management goals is assumed. People and forests come first and investors come second. The investment of public capital in private forestlands will require new ownership structures. Partnerships between private industrial owners and community utilities holding productivity easements will likely be required. Hometown jobs are seen as important and quality saw logs suitable for local processing and secondary manufacturing are valued. The management goals of a community forestry are as follows:
(a) High Quality and High Volume of Wood Per Year
The 140-year rotation forestry system is designed for growing large
trees and providing high timber production. New understandings of yield
tables for high-site Coast Range land suggests that maximum forest
productivity is not reached until after 100 years.
(b) High Wages
Companies always wish to lower costs. As rotation times decreased through
the 1960s, '70s and '80s, relative cost per 1000 board feet of timber
increased. In response, companies restructured the work force
and wages fell. Now as log prices come back to historic levels, long-rotation
forestry will provide profit margins
to make high wages possible.
(c) High Profit
The total amount of profit the exhibit's community forest generates is
expected to be higher than that of current corporate forestry. While
many factors enter into actual net profits, we believe the basic historic
cost/income advantage of growing large saw logs suggests long-rotation
forestry will provide greater
profit.
(d) Protection of Forest and Watershed Health
A community forest owned wholly or partly by local interests will not be
managed by executives forced to wear the blinders currently required by
investor-driven companies. The forest's use and benefit to the
community as a whole will be considered first and foremost. A vigorously
growing forest made up of many older (but not necessarily old growth) stands is less
susceptible to fire and is more disease resistant. Long-rotation forestry
will be far gentler on watershed processes and fish habitat. Large wood
falling into streams--something fish biologists say is essential to fish
habitat--will naturally occur as a result of older forested areas.
Rotation refers to the oldest age that forestland owners will let their trees grow. For Coast Range industrial lands that's usually about forty-five years. A land owner may cut more or fewer trees this year than next. But if a company uses a forty-five year rotation, every tree growing today will be cut at some point within the next forty-five years.
On the almost two million acres of Coast Range industrial forestland, nearly equal amounts are cut each year. This means that industrial forest owners clear-cut approximately 1/45th of their forest each year. Unfortunately, high-site class Coast Range land is used for fiber production and low-quality saw logs. Yet, low-quality saw logs are grown in many other regions of the US and around the world. High-quality saw timber, which historically commands a premium price, should be a Coast Range specialty.
A lot of folks think 140 years is too long to wait to harvest trees. We agree. However, rotation is not about waiting and it is not about how much timber is cut. Rather, rotation is about how much land area (percentage of the ownership) is cut each year. Many people think in terms of a stand of trees or their small woodlot. From this perspective a hundred-year rotation means cutting the trees and then waiting for the next crop. However, at the scale of industrial forestry, a 100-year rotation means cutting 1% of the land each year or 10% every ten years.
How long forestland owners grow their trees has a big impact on the productivity of the forest. Robert Curtis, Chief Mensurationist for the Forest Service's Pacific Northwest Research Station in Olympia, has stated that very short rotations mean reductions in production per acre per year that vary from 20% to 50%. Curtis' statement is a powerful indictment of today's industrial forestry. What many have suspected is apparently true! Curtis used five different computer models, with various assumptions, and they all gave the same answer: Industrial owners are throwing away productive capacity by cutting too soon.
Environmental advocates often argue against the idea of rotation because they disagree with clearcutting and believe some of the forest should never be cut. We are not going to argue this point. Our purpose here is to expose the driver of today's forestry - the financial system. Therefore, our analysis had to compare two forestry systems using the same harvest methods. This allowed us to compare apples to apples and reveal the financial driver of return on equity.
"The strongest arguments in favor of private enterprise are based on efficiency and production. Not so in the case of [industrial timber]. The peculiar relationship between time and timber causes private industry to fail at its ostensive task: maximizing production." Ray Raphael in More Tree Talk
The above statement suggests that the economic forces driving timber production are shaped by the long time period needed to grow trees, and thus timber capital suffers from investor market forces. Endless hand-wringing by environmental and governmental leaders won't change the underlying economics of the timber industry. The sooner we deal with the problem of investor-driven forestry the sooner we will find permanent solutions.
The two graphics below present a new way of looking at forest size. The graphics show forest stands arranged by size, from left to right, smallest to largest. Because it takes trees time to grow, the bottom axis represents time. The bottom axis also shows forest area. The Corporate and Community Forest models each have 88,000 acres of trees; therefore, each 1/10th section along the bottom of each graphic represents about 8,800 acres of trees.
The timber industry says, "Oregon will never grow out of trees." Another statement the industry makes is that there are more trees growing today than at any time in the past. Well, everyone knows that 10,000 seedlings don't equal a large Douglas fir. Seedlings and pole stands don't do a thing for a logger needing the next tree to cut. What has always been lacking is a visual representation of just how big (that is, how productive) the industry's "ever growing" forests actually are!
These forest graphs are based on the same vertical scales for tree height and Scribner volume. The graph's height scale from top to bottom is 250 feet. The vertical grey bars represent Scribner Board Foot volume (a Scribner board foot is a piece of wood one square foot by one inch thick), and are scaled top to bottom at 200,000 board feet. For our analysis we figure that an equal amount of land area is cut each year. In practice industrial forest owners may cut more one year than the next, but over a five or ten-year period the amount remains fairly constant.
Key Facts of the Exhibit's Corporate Forest:
Key Facts of the Exhibit's Community Forest:
Neither of the forest models attempts to introduce "alternative" forest practices. In all cases our figures are based on the ordinary practices of today's industrial forest owners. The figures presented for each forest model were based on 100,000 acre tracts of high-site growing land. Within each 100,000 acre forest we assume 88% of the land is usable for growing trees.
For the Corporate Forest model we assume a commercial thinning at 30 years of age. Some corporate forestland owners do not thin at age 30, instead opting to clear cut at 38 to 40 years. For the Community Forest model we assume commercial thinning at 30, 45, 65, and 100 years. We know of one industrial owner who has developed a 140-year rotation model that eliminates the 100-year thin on the assumption that unacceptable damage may occur when falling trees in a 100-year-old stand.
The following figures show the Forest Income, Expenses and Profit for the Corporate Forest model and the Community Forest model:
|
Total Forest Volume (Scribner bf) |
1,019,669,786 bf |
|
Annual Thin Volume 2,222 Acres (30-year-old forest) |
11,492,236 bf |
|
Annual Clearcut Volume 2,222 Acres (45-year-old forest) |
79,109,238 bf |
| Total Yearly Cut |
90,601,474 bf |
|
Dollar Value of Cut Volume (selling value of logs) |
$57,182,977 |
|
Total Cost of Operations (harvest, haul & land) |
$21,154,675 |
| Gross Profit | $ 36,028,302 |
|
Total Forest Volume (Scribner Bf) |
5,284,483,914 bf |
|
Annual Thin Volume 2,856 Acres (714 acres each of 30, 45, 65, and 100-year-old stands) |
42,139,788 bf |
|
Annual Clearcut Volume (714 acres of 140-year-old forest) |
82,955,882 bf |
| Total Yearly Cut |
125,095,670 bf |
|
Dollar Value of Cut Volume (sale value of logs) |
$104,171,773 |
| Total Cost of Operations | $ 25,538,457 |
| Gross Operating Profit | $ 78,633,316 |
A word of caution:
The above operating profits are not what a company will report as
their actual net profit. At least two additional costs must be
subtracted from forest operating profit:
1. Business overhead such as advertising, research, marketing and management (lawyers, accountants, and in the case of large corporations, the huge salaries paid to top managers).
2. The interest paid on borrowed money used to purchase land
and timber and to build roads.
In his book More Tree Talk, Ray Raphael states, "Because trees do not grow faster than compound interest, no investor-controlled business will spend money today for a payoff fifty or more years away."
The above analysis demonstrates in numbers the problem of investor economics and its inherent conflict with managing a long living forest system. For every dollar of positive cash flow in the Community Forest, 67 board feet of standing timber is on the land. For every dollar of positive cash flow in the Corporate Forest, 27 board feet of standing timber is on the land.
A basic fact of Coast Range forest growth is this: a 140-year rotation forest turns out almost twice the yearly profit as the 45-year rotation, and has five times the Scribner volume (which represents cash value) than the 45-year rotation forest.
Adding to the underlying financial problem are corporate raiders.
A 140-year rotation forest has a higher cash value than does a 45-year rotation forest. Owning a forest with too high a cash value exposes the corporation to being raided. A corporate raider could possibly buy the company's stock, the value of which is linked to profits, and then liquidate a company holding too large a forest inventory in order to pay off the stock purchase. Because a forest owned by a publicly held company is vulnerable to a corporate raid there is always pressure to reduce forest volume.
The economic system in which we operate places investors at the center of decision making. In the Coast Range, investor-driven landowners control almost 40% of the land base and thus control our communities and their futures. The financial efficiency of the corporate forest is greater than that of the community forest. In the eyes of Wall Street, the corporate forest wins the battle of ratios, while the community loses.
It takes a huge investment to grow a 140-year rotation forest, just as it takes a huge investment to grow (or buy) a 45-year rotation forest. Investors are primarily concerned with what their payback on investment will be. When investors are in control, the rate of profit from investment is more important than the amount of profit made by a forest holding.
To find paths toward rebuilding forest capital, we must first understand why corporations practice low-quality forestry. We hope this document has helped you to better understand an important part of the forest industry. To understand a problem and state it correctly is the first step in finding its solution. We do not see forestry's "problem" being the large cash value of the Community Forest or its lower ratio of forest volume to profit. In fact we would be proud of a timber industry based on large saw timber, higher-paying jobs, and big working forests. To us, and we hope you agree, the problem lies in the economic system, ownership rules, and an electoral process that serves the interests of investors over the needs of timber workers and local communities. Investors and corporate CEOs are laughing all the way to the bank while environmentalists fight with loggers.
Corporate forest owners manage for their rate of return on capital. Over time, market forces pressure the company to liquidate timber and increase the rate of profit. While the market works well for Wall Street investors, it's hard on forests, timber workers and rural communities.
It is important to understand why corporations practice low-quality forestry. In the end, corporate forestry reflects national and global financial markets and their access to Coast Range private timberland.
Solutions lie in recognizing that financial markets fail to provide for long-living forest capital. In our 100,000-acre model, the Community Forest requires a public investment to support additional growing timber. We believe the long-term solution for sustainable forestry involves creating community forest ownerships. To this end, we support the Lincoln County-based Coastal Oregon Community Forest project.
One final bonus: Because trees remove large amounts of carbon dioxide from the air, international leaders have identified forest growth as one solution to global warming. There is the real possibility that carbon polluters may have to offset some carbon emissions by buying carbon storage in forests. This money could become a source of investment capital for a community-based forestry.
The Coast Range Association is working to find solutions to the problem of poor Corporate Forestry. Falling relative wages, over-cutting, and job losses from Corporate Forestry are no longer acceptable. We believe that solutions exist. We have shown that Community Forestry makes sense and serves everyone's long term interests.
Forestry driven by corporate investors locks people out of forest management. Community participation in forest management is needed to recover Coast Range Forest productivity.
The choice is clear: We need forests that work for Coast Range communities--not for the outside investors that control
The Organon Model
The basic assumptions of tree growth, standing forest volume and yearly
cut were derived by using the
computer program ORGANON. ORGANON was developed at Oregon State
University (OSU) and is commonly used by commercial foresters. The
ORGANON program advertises itself as valid for periods
up to 110 years. However, we knew of foresters at OSU and the Siuslaw
National Forest who were using ORGANON to model stand growth for longer
rotations that provide large trees and high timber volume. We also knew that staff at the Mapleton Ranger District of the Siuslaw National Forest had been working
with OSU foresters on long-rotation silvicultural strategies. We
requested the ORGANON work from former Siuslaw National Forest
Supervisor Jim Furnish, and the Siuslaw staff was very helpful in providing
us with their work.
Using ORGANON, the Siuslaw staff developed a 140-year rotation which used thinning at 30, 45, 65, and 100 years. Their model was designed in part to optimize Scribner board foot yield. To use ORGANON, an initial assumption of stand conditions is required starting at age 15 years. The Forest Service used a research plot believed valid for the ORGANON calculations. Thinning prescriptions and frequency were adjusted for conditions typical of coastal forestland in the Hebo and Mapleton Ranger Districts. The model assumes only Douglas fir as the growing stock.
For the 45-year rotation model we used the initial 45-year values from the Forest Service's 140-year model. Asking several foresters, we found that tree height, log sizes, and board foot volumes from that run were close to or slightly higher than what industrial owners experience. We have been told by several individuals that our 45-year Corporate Forest is too generous. We understand that 30-year thinning is being abandoned and corporate owners are moving to just one cut in the 35 to 40-year age range.
The ORGANON program gives a detailed picture, in five-year intervals, of the forest on one acre. The data ORGANON produces includes (1) trees height, (2) log size, (3) cubic and Scribner board foot volumes, (4) trees per acre (5) and crown size. For the analysis, we assumed that each forest was cut at an equal yearly rate. We calculated the full forest Scribner size by multiplying the numbers in each ORGANON age group by the number of acres each age group occupies in the 88,000-acre land base. This allowed us to determine each forest's height profile and standing Scribner volumes for comparison purposes.
The dollar value of the harvested logs was derived by converting the various ORGANON cut table data into rough log grades based on diameter. While it is not possible to assign precise log grades from ORGANON, we believe our grades to be accurate and reasonable. We used Log Grades derived from a Columbia River Log Scaling & Grading Bureau publication and a paper by Dr. John Sessions (1978), Effects of Harvesting Technology Upon Optimal Stocking Regimes of Forest Stands In Mountainous Terrain. Once the data (trees) were placed into log grades they were assigned values based on average log prices (1996-97) as found on the Oregon Department of Forestry's web page. We are aware that current log prices are more favorable to small logs. The cash value of the log grades is based on a mill-delivered price. This is the value that the mill will pay for delivered logs. The revenue from each forest's yearly harvest was then calculated by multiplying the number of acres harvested with the log revenue from the ORGANON acre. This gave us each forest's log production and sales revenue.
We then calculated how much it would cost to log, deliver, and replant each forest's yearly cut volume and acreage. Also, we needed to factor in a cost per acre for the general operational expenses for each forest's full 100,000 acres. General operational expenses include taxes, road maintenance and related land ownership costs.
The first phase of logging involves preparing the site for cutting, referred to as "cut prep." These are costs associated with preparing a stand for a clear-cut or thin and include final cruise, tree marking, boundary location, and contract preparation. Our cost estimates came from several practicing foresters.
Actual logging costs include felling, bucking, yarding, and loading. We used costs provided by staff at Siuslaw National Forest's Hebo Ranger District, one industrial forest owner, and an OSU forest economist. Logging costs are inversely proportional to tree diameter. That is, the bigger the tree the less it costs to cut and yard a board foot of timber. Thinning cost per acre, per thousand board foot will generally cost more than a clear cut.
"Haul" costs were calculated from two different quotes obtained from Philomath-based companies. We used haul distances from Siletz to Philomath and Siletz to Springfield. We then averaged them to arrive at a representative haul cost. Haul costs are also inversely proportional to tree diameter. Again, bigger logs cost less to haul than smaller logs.
Forest "overhead" includes fire protection, road maintenance, staff, property tax, and equipment. These figures were averages based on numbers offered by one industrial forestland owner, one industrial forest land management company and an economics professor at OSU.
Replanting or "regen" costs were based on a study by resource economist Hans D. Radtke. Regeneration costs include site prep, planting, release survival, and animal protection. We also checked costs with several industrial owners. Under the federal tax code, replanting costs cannot be taken in the year they occur but must be amortized over time as if they were an investment. Since it is state law that a forestland owner must reestablish the forest after a clear-cut, we believe the proper perspective should be that regeneration costs are part of the cost to cut trees. In any case, the bill to replant must be paid when replantings occur.
We wish to thank the individuals, professional foresters, university researchers and people working in the forest industry who contributed information to this project. Particularly, without the information and generous assistance provided by Tom Haswell, this project would not have been completed. The initial stand condition and thinning prescriptions for the 140-year rotation model were developed by staff at the Siuslaw National Forest. All exhibit photos are from the Forest Science Media Center at Oregon State University. Any errors of fact or analysis are the sole responsibility of the Coast Range Association.
The following reading list covers the topics of relevant to this report.
Brown, Beverly A. 1995. In Timber Country: Working People's Stories of Environmental Conflict and Urban Flight. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Burkhardt, Hans. 1993. Maximizing Forest Productivity: Resource Depletion and a Strategy to Resolve the Crisis. Fort Bragg, California: Author.
Carey, A. B., Lead Scientist, and C. Elliott, Project Manager (compilers). 1994. Washington Forest Landscape Management Project, Report No. 1. Washington State Department of Natural Resources.
Carey, A. B., C. Elliott, B. R. Lippke, J. Sessions, and others. 1996. Washington Forest Landscape Management Project: A Pragmatic, Ecological Approach to Small-Landscape Management, Report No. 2. Washington State Department of Natural Resources.
Carroll, Matthew S. 1995. Community & the Northwestern Logger: Continuities and Changes in the Era of the Spotted Owl. San Francisco: Westview Press.
Costanza, R., J. Cumberland, H. Daly, R. Goodland, and R. Norgaard. 1997. An Introduction to Ecological Economies. Boca Raton: St. Lucie Press.
Curtis, Robert O., and David D. Marshall. 1993. Douglas-Fir Rotations--Time for Reappraisal? Western Journal of Applied Forestry. 8(3): 81-85.
Harris, David. 1995. The Last Stand: The War Between Wall Street and Main Street over California's Ancient Redwoods. New York: Random House.
Kohm, Kathryn A., and Jerry F. Franklin. (eds.). 1997. Creating a Forestry for the 21st Century. Covelo, CA: Island Press.
Lindenmayer, David, and Jerry Franklin. 2002. Conserving Forest Biodiversity, A Comprehensive
Multi-Scaled Approach. Covelo, CA: Island Press.
Lippke, Bruce R., John Sessions, and Andrew B. Carey. 1996. Economic Analysis of Forest Landscape Management Alternatives. Seattle, WA: College of Forest Resources.
McEvoy, Thom J. 1998. Legal Aspects of Owning and Managing Woodlands. Covelo, CA: Island Press.
National Research Council. 1998. Forested Landscapes in Perspective: Prospects and Opportunities for Sustainable Management of America's Nonfederal Forests. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Newton, Michael, and Elizabeth C. Cole. 1987. A Sustained-Yield Scheme for Old-Growth Douglas-fir. Western Journal of Applied Forestry. 2(1):22-25.
Raphael, Ray. 1994. More Tree Talk: The People, Politics, and Economics of Timber. Covelo, CA: Island Press.
Raphael, Ray. 1981. Tree Talk: The People and Politics of Timber. Covelo, CA: Island Press.
Robbins, William G. 1994. Colony & Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.